Limitations of Skeptical Default Reasoning by Doerpmund, Jens
150 
Limitations of Skeptical Default Reasoning 
J ens Doerpmund 
Department of Computer Science 
University of Manchester, 
Manchester M13 9PL, UK 
jens@cs.man.ac.uk 
Abstract 
Poole has shown that nonmonotonic logics do 
not handle the lottery paradox correctly. In 
this paper we will show that Pollock's the­
ory of defeasible reasoning fails for the same 
reason: defeasible reasoning is incompatible 
with the skeptical notion of derivability. 
1 Introduction 
In the preface to "Cognitive Carpentry: A Blueprint 
for How to Build a Person" John Pollock argues that 
"work in artificial intelligence has made less progress 
than expected because it has been based upon inad­
equate foundations. AI systems are supposed to behave 
rationally, but their creators have not generally come to 
the problem equipped with an account of what it is to 
behave rationally." OSCAR, Pollock's framework for 
a reasoning engine, on the other hand, is "capable of 
performing reasoning that philosophers would regard 
as epistemologically sophisticated [Pollock, 1995] ." 
Pollock claims that because many theories of uncer­
tain reasoning are semantical (i.e. proceeding in terms 
of models) rather than syntactical (i.e. proceeding in 
terms of arguments which may defeat one another), 
they are "unable to adequately formulate principles 
of probabilistic reasoning [Pollock , 1990, Chapter 8]." 
Unfortunately, the fact that Pollock's framework is not 
characterized semantically makes it very difficult to de­
termine which conclusions it sanctions. It may be for 
this reason that the mistake in Pollock's analysis re­
garding the important distinction between the paradox 
of the preface and the lottery paradox ([Pollock, 1990], 
[Pollock, 1994], [Pollock, 1995]) remained undetected. 
This is very unfortunate since other relevant problems 
of default reasoning (i.e. preference for more specific 
knowledge and contrapositive reasoning) pose no prob­
lem in Pollock's framework. Let us start with a review 
of the lottery paradox in default reasoning. 
2 Default Reasoning and the Lottery 
Paradox 
In standard logic we are not able to draw conclusions if 
the available evidence is insufficient to guarantee their 
correctness. Default reasoning , on the other hand, al­
lows us to jump to conclusions even if the knowledge 
about the domain at hand is incomplete. Some of these 
conclusions may turn out to be incorrect and must be 
abandoned in order to avoid inconsistencies. To make 
this more precise, we provide a brief introduction to 
Reiter's default logic [Reiter, 1980]. 
2.1 Default Logic 
Reiter's default logic supports rules like 'if a(x) is prov­
able and if it is consistent to belief b(x), then derive 
c(x).' These rules are not expressed in the underlying 
object language, but can be seen as additional infer­
ence rules which augment those provided by first-order 
logic. Such a rule, which is called a default, has the fol­
lowing form: 
a(x): b1(x), ... ,bn(x) 
c(x) 
(1) 
where a(x), b1(x), . .. , bn(x), and c(x) are first-order 
formulae whose free variables are among those of x = 
(x1, ... , xm ) . The meaning of a default is that c{x) is 
believed if a(x) is known to be true and b1(x), ... , bn(x) 
are consistent with what is known (i.e. -.b;(x) cannot 
be deduced). A default is called applicable if both of 
these conditions are satisfied; otherwise it is inapplic­
able. For example the statement "Birds usually fly" is 
expressed by the default 
bird(x): flies(x) 
flies(x) 
(2) 
A default theory A is a pair (D, W) of sets, where 
W contains ordinary first-order sentences representing 
knowledge about a particular domain, and D is a set 
of defaults, which are used to (partially) extend this 
knowledge by making plausible, but logically invalid 
inferences. Belief sets which are obtained by taking all 
formulae which can be deductively derived from both 
W and the consequents of all applicable defaults of D 
are called extensions of the theory 6..1 
2.2 Multiple Extensions 
A problem of default logic is that we often obtain mul­
tiple extensions. Consider the following classical ex­
ample: 
Example 1 (Nixon-Diamond) 
Quakers are typically pacifists. 
Republicans are typically not pacifists. 
Nixon is a Quaker and a Republican. 
Is Nixon a pacifist? 
This can be encoded into the default theory 6 = 
(D, W), where D = 
{ Quaker{x) : pacifist{x) Republican(x) : --.pacifist(x) } 
pacifist(x) ' --.pacifist{x) 
and W = { Quaker{x) A Republican{x)}. 
The extensions of 6. are 
E1 Cn( {Quaker( Nixon), Repub-
lican{Nixon), pacifist(Nixon)}) and 
E2 Cn( { Quaker{Nixon), Repub-
lican(Nixon), -.pacifist(Nixon)} ), 
The generation of multiple extensions is very com­
mon in logic-based frameworks for reasoning under 
uncertainty. What, then, can be inferred from the de­
fault theory of Example 1? According to Reiter, paci­
fist{Nixon) is provable, because each extension can be 
seen as an acceptable belief set and pacifist{Nixon) is 
contained in one of them. But by the same argument 
--.pacifist{Nixon) is provable. This "credulous" view 
which allows us to choose an extension does not seem 
to be a rational way of "proving" a sentence, since we 
can base our choice on what we actually want to infer. 
This problem is avoided in skeptical default reasoning, 
according to which a sentence is a theorem of a de­
fault theory if and only if the sentence is contained in 
(the intersection of) all extensions.2 In Example 1, we 
would therefore not be justified in believing either pa­
cifist{Nixon) or --.pacifist(Nixon). Although this seems 
to be the correct approach in this particular example, 
we will soon see that there are default theories which 
lead to rather peculiar results. 
2.3 The Lottery Paradox 
Consider the following example taken from 
[Poole, 1991, p. 290]: 
1See [Reiter, 1980] for a formal definition of an 
extension. 
2Note that the intersection of extensions is itself not an 
extension, since there are always applicable defaults which 
have not been applied. 
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Example 2 (Qualitative Lottery Paradox) Suppose 
we want to build a knowledge base about birds. Sup­
pose also that all we are told about Tweety is that 
Tweety is a bird. We first state knowledge about the 
different birds we are considering: 
Vx.bird(x):::::: emu(x) Vpenguin(x) V hummingbird(x) 
Vsandpiper(x)Valbatross(x)V ... V 
canary(x). We now state defaults about birds (e.g., 
they fly, are within certain size ranges, nest in trees, 
etc.). For each sort of bird that is exceptional in some 
way we will be able to conclude that Tweety is not that 
sort of bird: 
• We conclude that Tweety is not an emu or a pen­
guin because they are exceptional in not flying. 
• We conclude that Tweety is not a hummingbird as 
hummingbirds are exceptional in their size {. . .} 
The reason that we divide the class of birds into sub­
classes is because each subclass is exceptional in some 
way. Rather than being a pathological example, this 
would seem to be the general rule, typical of hierarch­
ies with exceptions. 
This example is a qualitative version of the lottery 
paradox [Kyburg, Jr., 1961]. The original version is 
as follows: 
Example 3 (Lottery Paradox) Consider a fair lot­
tery consisting of one million tickets, only one of them 
is a winning ticket. Suppose you possess one ticket. 
Since the probability of winning the prize is 0.000001, 
it seems reasonable to infer that your ticket will not 
win. By the same argument it is reasonable to infer 
that each ticket will not win. This, however, is incon­
sistent since one ticket must be the winning ticket. 
In both of the above�mentioned examples we end up 
having inconsistent beliefs. In default logic, however, 
we are only allowed to apply defaults if it is consistent 
to do so. Thus, in the lottery we would infer that the 
first 999,999 tickets will lose and- in order to maintain 
consistency- that ticket No. 1,000,000 will win. Since 
the order in which defaults are applied is irrelevant, we 
will get 999,999 other extensions. The intersection of 
all extensions does not contain any default inferences 
whatsoever. Thus, although it is very likely that, say, 
ticket No. 4 711 is a losing ticket, we are not able to 
infer this in default logic. In the qualitative example, 
we might infer in one extension that Tweety is an emu, 
in another extension that Tweety is a sand-piper. The 
number of extensions will be the same as the number 
of different kinds of birds. Since there are extensions 
in which Tweety is a non-flying bird, we are not able 
to infer that Tweety can fly if we opt for the skeptical 
view and decide to accept only beliefs contained in the 
intersection of all extensions. 
The lottery paradox is indeed a serious problem in 
default reasoning. It arises whenever jointly incon­
sistent defaults are equally strong. Often, however, 
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one default should be preferred over another default. 
This is normally the case when one default is more 
specific than a competing one. Unfortunately, default 
reasoning systems, as described in [Poole, I984] or 
[Reiter, I980] are not capable of deciding which de­
faults are more specific and should therefore be pre­
ferred (i.e. applied first). Contraposition is yet another 
problem in default reasoning. For instance, knowing 
that birds normally fly, we may want to infer that an 
individual that can not fly is (normally) not a bird. 
But often contrapositive reasoning is not desired. We 
certainly don't want to infer that something that can 
fly is not an object, given that objects normally don't 
fly. Again, default reasoning systems are not capable of 
deciding under which circumstances the contraposition 
on defaults should be considered. 
3 Pollock's Theory of Defeasible 
Reasoning 
Pollock's theory of defeasible reasoning constitutes a 
probabilistic framework that supports the detachment 
of beliefs by means of acceptance rules. Deductions are 
performed both on the level of probabilities and on the 
level of beliefs. The simplest acceptance rule, called 
(AI), is as follows [Pollock, I990]. 
Definition 1 (AI) If F is projectible3 with respect to 
G and r > 0.5 then G(c) 1\ Pr(F I G) � r is a prima 
facie reason for F(c), the strength of the reason de­
pending upon the value of r. 
The reasons for beliefs we obtain by applying (AI) 
are only prima facie reasons - that is, they can be 
defeated by so-called defeaters. Pollock distinguishes 
between undercutting de/eaters, which attack the con­
nection between a prima facie reason and its conclu­
sion, and rebutting de/eaters, which are reasons for 
denying a conclusion. A belief is warranted if and only 
if it has at least one prima facie reason which cannot 
be defeated. 
An important undercutting defeater is the following. 
Definition 2 (Dl) If F is projectible with respect to 
H, then H(c)l\ 
Pr(F I GAH) "I Pr(F I G) is an undercutting defeater 
for (Al). 
(DI) defeats prima facie reasons generated by (AI) 
whenever (AI) does not take all relevant information 
into account. Thus, the preference of reasons based on 
more specific information is dealt with correctly and 
does not need to be provided as in default logic. 
An fundamental principle of Pollock's framework is the 
principle of collective defeat [Pollock, 1990, pp. 88]. 
3The projectibility constraint is explained in 
[Pollock, 1990]. It is of no importance to our discussion. 
Definition 3 (Collective Defeat) If we have 
equally good independent reasons for believing each 
member of a minimal set of jointly inconsistent 
propositions, and none of the reasons is contradictory 
in any other way, then none of the propositions in the 
set is justified. 
The justification for the priciple of collective defeat is 
easily stated. Each � of a minimal set of inconsistent 
propositions {P1, ... , PN} is rebutted (and therefore not 
warranted), because its negation is deductively entailed 
by the conjunction P1 1\ ... A Pi-1 A PHI 1\ ... !\ PN. 
Note that the principle of collective defeat is very sim­
ilar to the skeptical notion of derivability in default 
logic. In fact, in the lottery example Pollock's frame­
work sanctions the same conclusions as we would get 
in default logic. For instance, in Example 2 collective 
defeat forces us to remain agnostic about what kind of 
bird Tweety is. But this, it seems, does not affect the 
inference from the evidence stating that most birds fly 
to our believing that Tweety can fly. 
However, in "The Collapse of Collective Defeat: Les­
sons from the Lottery Paradox," Kevin Korb con­
structs an argument against collective defeat that does 
not rely on the generation of multiple extensions. His 
criticism is based on the fact that "one can 'lotter­
ize' just about any inductive inference problem, and 
so, if using Pollock's Rule [i.e. collective defeat], one 
will almost always be constrained to indecision, even 
concerning the most ordinary, dull, unobjectionable in­
ferences" [Korb, I992]. Lotterization, of course, refers 
to the process of dividing the sample space of an ex­
periment into many partitions such that each member 
of the partition has an equally low probability of being 
selected. Korb's argument, then, is as follows. Let P 
be a proposition that has a high probability, and let Q 
be the negation of P. Normally, this would give us a 
reason for concluding P (and consequently •Q).  We 
now lotterize both P and Q such that all members of 
P and Q have roughly the same low probability. Thus, 
our knowledge base contains the following information: 
p = -,Q, 
P := P1 V P2 V ... PM, 
Q:=Q1VQ2V ... QN, 
Pr(P )  =I- Pr(Q) ='high', 
Pr(-,Pi) � Pr(-,Qj ) ='high', 
for all i E {I, . . ,M},j E {I, . .. ,N}. 
Since exactly one disjunct of 
is true, collective defeat applies and prevents us from 
believing the negations of any of the disjuncts. In par­
ticular, we are not warranted in believing any of the 
-,Qi. Our reasoning so far has had no influence on the 
high probability of P. Nevertheless, we cannot con­
clude P anymore. Suppose P were warranted - that 
is, we have no reason for believing ..,p that is as strong 
as the reason for believing P. Then we would be able 
to infer any of the -,Q; deductively. But, as we have 
seen, collective defeat prevents us from concluding any 
of the ...,Qi. Therefore, Korb argues, P cannot be war­
ranted. 
But Korb's argument is wrong. Precisely because we 
can infer ...,Q; from P, the partition Korb has chosen is 
not minimal any more.4 The minimal partition would 
just contain the ...,pi· In other words, we would not 
be justified in believing any of the -,pi (because of 
collective defeat), but we would be able to infer each 
of the -,Q;, because P is warranted. If, on the other 
hand, P is not warranted, then Korb's argument is 
correct but irrelevant, because we do not need further 
arguments against P. 
3.1 The Paradox of the Preface vs. the 
Lottery Paradox 
Even proponents of collective defeat acknowledge that 
there are situations in which the principle should not 
be applied. For instance, a person (vacuously) be­
lieves all of his beliefs, but he also believes that some 
of his beliefs are wrong (although he does not know 
which). Should he apply the principle of collective 
defeat and remain agnostic about everything he be­
lieves? Consider the following problem taken from 
[Makinson, 1965]. 
Suppose that in the course of his book a 
writer makes a great many assertions, which 
we shall call s1, . .. , Sn· Given each one of 
these, he believes that it is true. If he has 
already written other books, and received 
corrections from readers and reviewers, he 
may also believe that not everything he has 
written in his latest book is true. His ap­
proach is eminently rational; he has learnt 
from experience. The discovery of errors 
among statements which previously he be­
lieved to be true gives him a good ground 
for believing that there are undetected errors 
in his latest book [Makinson, 1965]. 
The structure of this paradox of the preface5 is very 
similar to the lottery paradox. As in the lottery case, 
we seem to be justified in believing each statement 81, 
.. . , 8n while at the same time we are justified in be­
lieving -,81 V ... V 'Sn. However, if we applied the 
principle of collective defeat to the paradox of the pre­
face, we would no longer be justified in believing any 
of the statements mentioned in the book! Examples 
like the paradox of the preface arise naturally in de­
fault reasoning. What distinguishes default reasoning 
4Cf. Definition 3 for a definition of collective defeat. 
5The name of the paradox refers to the preface of a book 
in which it is common that authors acknowledge the support 
of various people, but take responsibility for any mistakes 
remaining in the book. 
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from deductive reasoning is that the inferences in de­
fault reasoning need not be valid, but merely plaus­
ible. Suppose, then, that the conclusions we derive 
from our evidence have a probability of 99.9% on av­
erage. Given that we have made more then 1000 infer­
ences, we should have a good reason for believing that 
at least one of the conclusions is wrong. If we were to 
apply collective defeat in this case, we would not be 
able to perform default reasoning at all. 
Pollock therefore provides a reason for treating in­
stances of the lottery paradox and the paradox of the 
preface differently. The tickets in the lottery, Pollock 
argues, are negatively relevant. That is, inferring that a 
ticket loses makes it more likely that one of the remain­
ing tickets is the winning ticket. We therefore cannot 
possibly conclude that all tickets are winning tickets 
without obtaining an inconsistent belief set. Contrast 
this with the paradox of the preface. Here, the state­
ments made in the book are positively relevant. Con­
firming one statement decreases the probability that 
there exists a wrong statement, which in turn makes 
the other statements more likely (Pollock, 1995, p. 128]. 
We could, therefore, consistently believe each of the 
statements, and, as a consequence, discard the belief 
stating that (at least) one statement is wrong. 
Thus, rather than seeing the above examples as ar­
guments supporting the view that uncertain reasoning 
frameworks be able to handle inconsistent information, 
Pollock prefers to ignore that the belief set is prob­
ably inconsistent. This view is not uncommon. In 
[Lehrer, 1990], for instance, it is argued that if we ac­
cept that at least one of our beliefs is wrong, then we 
forgo the chances of achieving the ideal of maxiveri­
ficity. A person is called maxiverific if he accepts all 
true statements and rejects all false statements by some 
rational methodology. Lehrer claims that it is not irra­
tional for a sensible person to "adopt maxiverificity as 
an ideal and refuse to follow a policy that guarantees 
failure [Lehrer, 1990]." Lehrer therefore comes to the 
same conclusion as Pollock: he suggests to ignore that 
some of the beliefs may be wrong. 6 
Let us restate Pollock's argument regarding positive 
and negative relevance in more detail. We know that 
most statements contained in a book are true, but we 
also know that it is very likely that at least one of 
them is false. We therefore have prima facie reasons 
for believing each of the statements Si as well as 
(3) 
These beliefs are inconsistent, and it appears that they 
are subject to collective defeat. Although we would 
like to believe each of the si, we can construct ar­
guments for their negations. Suppose the statements 
s1, ... ,Sj-1,8j+l, ... ,SNare warranted. After all, each 
statement has a high probability of being true. From 
6However, Lehrer acknowledges that there are other 
strategies that may be equally rational. 
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this we can conclude 
81 1\ ··· /\ 8j-1 /\ 8j+ll\ ... I\ 8N· {4) 
(3) and (4) together deductively imply ....,8j, and it 
seems that we are no longer justified in believing 8J. 
However, we can show that the argument for -.si is 
defeated. Since the statements in the book are not 
negatively relevant to each other, the confirmation of 
some statements does not make the remaining state� 
ments more likely. Instead , confirming a statement 
decreases the probability that the book contains false 
statements. 
Claim: 
The following equation, which, according to (D1), 
provides an undercutting defeater for the inference 
leading to (3), holds. 
< 
Proof: 
Pr(-.s1 V ... V -.sN I 
81 1\ ... /\ Bi-1 /\ 8i+l /\ ... /\ SN) 
Pr(-.sl V ... V -.sN) (5) 
If { s1 , ... , s N} is a set of propositions that are positively 
relevant, then 
Pr(8i I 81/\ ... /\ 8i-1 /\ si+l /\ ... I\ SN) > Pr(si)· (6) 
Since 
Pr(si I s 1 /\ ... /\ Si-1 1\ 8i+II\ ... /\ SN) 
1- Pr(-.8i I 81/\ ... /\ Bi-11\ 8i+11\ ... /\ 8N) 
1- Pr(-.sl V ... V -.sN I 
> 
81 /\ ··· /\ Si-1 1\ Si+1 1\ ... 1\ SN) 
Pr( Si) = 1 - Pr( -.8i), 
it follows that 
Pr( ...,81 V ... V -.5N I 
81/\ ... /\ 8jl /\ Bi+11\ ... I\ 8N) I 
< Pr(...,8i)· 
(7} 
(8) 
Because the right hand side of (8) is less or equal than 
Pr{-.81 V ... V -.sN), (5) holds. D 
Therefore, (3) is not warranted, and we can conclude 
that all statements in the book are true. 
According to Pollock, collective defeat applies if and 
only if the members of a minimal set of jointly incon� 
sistent beliefs are negatively relevant [Pollock, 1994]. 
Clearly, if (3) were certain, then the statements would 
be negatively relevant. (3) states that (at least) one 
statement is false. Since all statements have the same 
probability of being true, the confirmation of one state­
ment makes the other statements less likely if we also 
know that there are false statements. However - and 
this is where Pollock is mistaken, the converse is not 
true. Collective defeat can be defeated even if the pro� 
positions are negatively relevant. 
Consider a lottery which is not always fair: every lOOth 
draw does not contain a winning ticket. Since most 
draws are fair, we have a prima facie reason for be­
lieving t1 V ... V twooooo. Clearly, confirming that some 
tickets are losing tickets makes it more likely that the 
winning ticket is among the remaining tickets. Thus, 
the tickets are negatively relevant. However, the more 
tickets we confirm, the more probable it is that the cur­
rent draw contains only losing tickets. Thus, we have 
an undercutting defeater for concluding 
t1 V t2 V ... V twooooo (9) 
despite the fact that the tickets are negatively relevant: 
Pr(t1 V t2 V ... V twooooo I 
-.t1 1\ ... /\ -.ti-1 /\ --,ti+I 1\ ... /\ --,tiOooooo ) 
< Pr(t1 V t2 V ... V twooooo ) . (10) 
Without (9) being warranted, we can infer that all tick­
ets are losing tickets. 
Because our argument does not depend on the negative 
relevance of the propositions in the belief set, it has a 
devastating consequence. We can basically lotterize 
any proposition P having a high probability that is 
smaller than 1. 
Claim: 
Let P =PI V P2 V ... V PN be a 'lotterization' of P. If 
N is sufficiently large, we have a reason for believing 
each of the -.pi, even when the Pi are not positively 
relevant. This, however, means that P can never be 
warranted. 
Proof: 
We need to show that we are justified in believing that 
all Pi are false. In order to do this we show that the 
following equation, which provides a defeater for be­
lieving PI V ... V PN, holds. 
< 
Pr(pl V ... V PN I 
-.pl 1\ ... /\ --,Pi-1 /\-,Pi+ I /\ ... 1\ --,PN) 
Pr(pl V ... V PN) . (11) 
Furthermore, we need to show that 
Pr(pl V ... V PN I 
--,PI 1\ ... 1\ ...,Pi-1 1\ 'Pi+1 1\ ... 1\ 'PN) (12) 
is less than 0.5 in order to make sure that the accept­
ance rule cannot be applied to create an undefeated 
reason for believing p1 V ... V PN. 
The probability of P being false given that all but one 
of the Pi are false is 
Pr(-.P I•PI 1\ . .. I\ ....,PJ-1 1\ ....,PJ+ll\ ... I\ 'PN) 
= 
= 
Pr( -,p 1\ """'PI 1\ ... /\ """'PJ�l 1\ ....,Pi+l 1\ ··· 1\ """'PN) 
Pr( ...,PI 1\ ... 1\ ....,PJ�l 1\ ....,PHI 1\ · ·· 1\ 'PN) 
Pr(...,P) (13) 
Pr(...,Pl 1\ ... 1\ ....,Pi-11\ ....,PHil\··· 1\ ....,PN) 
If we know that all but one of the Pi are false, then 
either the remaining Pi is true, or P is false. Thus, 
Pr(pj V -.P I 
-.p11\ ... I\ "'Pj-11\ ...,Pi+ll\ · · ·  1\ 'PN) 
= 1. (14) 
It follows that 
Pr(--,pll\ .. . I\ """'PJ�ll\ 'Pi+I 1\ ... 1\ ....,PN) 
Pr( --.P) + Pr(pj I P) 
1 
Pr(...,P) + 
N
' (15) 
From {13), {14) and (15) we obtain 
= 
= 
Pr(pi I """'P1/\ ... /\ ....,PJ�l 1\ ....,Pi+ll\ . .. I\ ....,PN) 
1- Pr(-,Pi I 
'Pl 1\ ... 1\ --,PJ�l 1\ --,PJ+l 1\ ... /\ 'PN) 
1_ 
Pr(...,P) 
Pr(-.pl 1\ ... I\ ....,PJ�l 1\ ..,Pi+l 1\ ... 1\ 'PN) 
1-
Pr(--,P) 
(16) 
Pr(•P) + -k. 
The right hand side of equation (16) decreases as N 
increases. Thus, we can make 
Pr(pj 1--.pl/\ ... I\ 'PJ�ll\ ...,Pi+ll\ ... I\ --.pN) (17) 
as small as we want. D 
P is no longer warranted if the value of ( 16) is smaller 
then 0.5, or equivalently, if 
N> . r 1 l Pr(--.P) 
4 Conclusions 
(18) 
We have shown that any proposition P which has a 
probability of less than 1.0 is not accepted in Pollock's 
framework. The reason is not � as Kolb believes -
because we could lotterize P and then show that the 
obtained disjuncts undergo collective defeat. Instead, 
the problem is that for each P = p1 V ... V PN, we can 
create a defeater 
Pr(pl V ... V PN I 
'PI 1\ ... I\ --,PJ-1 1\ 'Pi+ I 1\ ... 1\ -.pN) 
< Pr(p1V ... VpN). (19) 
But does the left-hand side of the above equation really 
provide more information than the right-hand side? 
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Clearly, each of the -.p; has a high probability and 
is therefore justified. However, given that one of the Pi 
must be true, and that we don't know which one it is, 
Pr(....,PI 1\ ... 1\ ....,Pj-1 1\ -.pi+l 1\ ... 1\ -.pN) 
is fairly low (namely 1/N). Thus, the conjunction 
should not be accepted and should therefore not con­
tribute to provide a defeater for P. If Pollock's frame­
work could be changed to take this into account, likely 
propositions could be warranted after all. But then 
we would no longer be able to distinguish between the 
lottery paradox and the paradox of the preface (and 
therefore not be justified in believing any statement 
contained in a book). In either case, Pollock's claim 
that OS CAR is "capable of performing reasoning that 
philosophers would regard as epistemologically soph­
isticated" does not withstand scrutiny. 
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